These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 - 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture."

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic.

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

661 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

475 where the state regulates
everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in
000 the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly
433 have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject
[685] of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

[UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION AS OF NOV. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

685 Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [421] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.